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CAN CONGRESS MAKE YOU BUY
BROCCOLI?' AND WHY IT REALLY
DOESN'T MATTER
DAVID ORENTLICHER, MD, JD*

Critics of the individual mandate to purchase health care insurance
make a simple but seemingly compelling argument. If the federal
government can require people to buy insurance because that would be
good for their health, then the government can require people to buy all
sorts of things that are good for their health, like broccoli or membership in
an exercise club. 2
To avoid the prospect of the ultimate nanny state, U.S. district court
judges in Florida 3 and Virginia 4 concluded that while the federal
government may regulate economic activity, it may not regulate economic
inactivity. Thus, once you decide to purchase health care insurance, the
government can regulate the terms of your insurance policy. However, you
cannot be forced to purchase the policy in the first place. To breach the
activity-inactivity line, wrote Judge Roger Vinson, would invite all kinds of
well-intended, but liberty-destroying, laws. 5

* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Samuel R. Rosen Professor of
Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. MD, JD, Harvard University. I am grateful for
the comments of Judy Failer, Shelly Kurtz, Todd Pettys and Rebecca Zietlow and the research
assistance of Taylor Wright.
1. Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Leonard H. Glantz, Can Congress Make You Buy
Broccoli? And Why That's a Hard Question, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 201 (2011).
2. Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform Are Well Grounded in Law-And Pose
Serious Challenges, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1229, 1232 (2010).
3. Florida v. U.S. Dept. HHS, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla., Jan. 31, 2011).
4. Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
5. U.S. Dept. HHS, 2011 WL 285683..
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This argument, then, does not rely on problems with the insurance
mandate itself. Rather, it rests on the implications for future laws if courts
uphold the mandate. We would start to slide down a slippery slope of
officious government, and we would no longer have the federal
government of limited powers that the founding fathers envisioned.
But the critics and judges have it backwards. If there's a slippery
slope, we would have reached bottom already. Even without blessing the
regulation of inactivity, the Supreme Court opened the door decades ago
for the federal government to make people buy insurance, broccoli or other
things that are good for their health. That this is the first time Congress has
done so is actually reassuring.
There are many problems with the "broccoli argument" and its
reliance on a distinction between activity and inactivity. For example, the
Supreme Court already has imposed meaningful limits on the power of
Congress to mandate behavior; further limits are not needed. Moreover, the
activity-inactivity distinction is illusory so cannot serve a useful purpose. In
any event, it is not realistic to suppose that Congress would ever impose a
broccoli mandate. The public would not stand for such a law. All of these
responses challenge the premises of the broccoli argument, and I will
discuss them at greater length. More importantly, I will show how the
broccoli argument is misguided even when taken on its own terms.
THERE Is No NEED TO IMPOSE NEW LIMITS
ON THE COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER
Proponents of the activity-inactivity distinction recommend it as a
way for courts to place some limits on the Commerce Clause power of
Congress.6 Over more than half a century, from the New Deal onward,
courts allowed increasingly expansive uses by Congress of the Commerce
Clause power-it was invoked to enact laws that restrict abortions7 or
protect endangered species8 and civil rights. 9 In the words of Judge Alex

Kozinski, the Commerce Clause had become for Congress the "Hey, youcan-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause."10
6.

Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You to Be Healthy?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at

7.
8.
9.

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Nat'l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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But in 1995, the Supreme Court reined the Commerce Clause power
in when it observed that while Congress may regulate economic activity,
Congress may not regulate non-economic activity." Invoking its distinction
between economic and non-economic activity, the Court struck down a law
banning possession of a gun on or near the grounds of a school1 2 and
another law prohibiting violent crimes that are committed because of a
person's gender. 13 While laws against both kinds of conduct are important,
wrote the Court, they should be enacted by state legislatures rather than by
Congress. The federal government would be extending its power too far if
it assumed responsibility for matters of local concern like K-12 education
and community crime. 14 On the other hand, the federal government acts
within its authority when it regulates economic activities that affect the
national economy.15 By distinguishing between economic and noneconomic activity, the Court already has imposed meaningful limits on the
Commerce Clause power.
THE ACTIVITY-INACTIVITY DISTINCTION IS ILLUSORY

Even if the Supreme Court needs to curtail the Commerce Clause
power further, trying to distinguish between economic activity and
economic inactivity will not do the trick. As three federal trial court judges
have concluded, one can easily characterize the individual mandate to
purchase health care as a regulation of the economic decision whether to
purchase a health insurance policy or instead to cover one's health care
costs through self-insurance. 16 Indeed, it is the same economic decision that
large companies regularly make when they choose between purchasing
insurance or relying on self-insurance to provide health care benefits for
their employees. Everyone seeks health care at some point, so it is not
accurate to say that a person can remain "inactive" with respect to the
health care system.
Even conceding that people who do not buy health care insurance are
inactive, it does not follow that Congress lacks the power to enact an
11.

Timothy S. Jost, Can Congress Regulate "Inactivity" (and Make Americans Buy Health

Insurance)?, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. el7 (2011).
12. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
14. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-566.
15. And of course, the health care law's regulation of health care insurance entails direct
regulation of the national economy.

16. Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C., Feb. 22, 2011); Thomas More Law Center v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Liberty University v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 611
(W.D. Va. 2010).
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individual mandate to purchase health care coverage. There is nothing in
the language or history of the Commerce Clause that limits its reach to the
regulation of activity.1 7 To be sure, lawmakers often distinguish between
activity and inactivity when they decide whether to regulate a person's
behavior.
Generally, society is much more willing to hold people
accountable for their activity than their inactivity. Thus, while it is against
the law to cause someone to drown by pushing the person into deep water,
it is not against the law to stand idly by and let someone drown who
already has fallen into the water. However, the activity-inactivity
distinction merely correlates with the distinction between unacceptable and
acceptable behavior. It does not define the line between the unacceptable
and the acceptable. At times, inactivity is just as problematic as activity.
As Justice Antonin Scalia has written, "It would not make much sense to
say that one may not kill oneself by walking into the sea, but may sit on the
beach until submerged by the incoming tide; or that one may not
intentionally lock oneself into a cold storage locker, but may refrain from
18
coming indoors when the temperature drops below freezing."
CONGRESS CAN REQUIRE PEOPLE TO BUY BROCCOLI
BY REGULATING ECONoMiC ACTIVITY
There is an even more fundamental problem with the activityinactivity distinction. Prohibiting the regulation of economic inactivity
would make no difference regarding the extent of the Commerce Clause
power. For any economic decision that Congress could reach by regulating
economic inactivity, Congress also could reach that decision by regulating
economic activity. Establishing an activity-inactivity distinction would not
protect the public from unwise legal mandates. The broccoli horse is
already out of the barn.
How can the federal government require you to purchase broccoli by
regulating only economic activity? Congress could pass a law that requires
you to order broccoli with your Big Mac®, cheese fries or other restaurant
17.
Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
Section
IIB
(forthcoming
June
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1747189.

18.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990) (Scalia, J.,

concurring). There also are times when inactivity is more problematic than activity. For example,
withholding a ventilator from a dying patient can be worse than withdrawing a ventilator from a dying
patient. In the case of a withdrawal, the patient is taken off the ventilator only after being given an
opportunity to beat the odds and do better than expected with treatment. When a ventilator is withheld,
the patient never receives the chance for an unexpected recovery. DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF
LIFE AND DEATH: MAKING MORAL THEORY WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 30 (2001).
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food. The law also would mandate the purchase of broccoli when you shop
at the grocery store. Anytime you bought some food, you would have to
buy broccoli (unless you could show you bought broccoli earlier that day or
week).
A mandate to buy broccoli with other food would not be first time that
the federal government required the purchase of a particular product when
people bought a related product. The U.S. Department of Transportation
requires you to buy seat belts, air bags and a catalytic converter when you
purchase a car. 19 The Consumer Product Safety Commission requires you
to buy guardrails for the upper bunk when you purchase a bunk bed. 20 The
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development requires you to buy
smoke alarms when you purchase a mobile home. 21 In all of these cases,
the federal government requires you to buy something you might not want
to buy by connecting it with the purchase of something you do want to buy.
What about people who do not buy any food but grow their own at
home? Isn't this the kind of economic inactivity that Judge Vinson and
other mandate critics claim may not be regulated by the federal
government? In an important 1942 decision, the Supreme Court held
otherwise. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court decided that growing your own
wheat for home consumption counts as economic activity. 22 Accordingly,
Congress could require people to cultivate broccoli when they grow their
own food (as part of a broad mandate for farmers to grow broccoli).
Congress could even reach the indigent who eat at soup kitchens or rely on
food pantries. The charitable kitchens and pantries are considered
economic actors, and the law could require them to serve broccoli with
their meals or add it to their provisions. Everyone would be bound by the
obligation to include broccoli in their diet. 23
Because people will become subject to the insurance mandate in 2014
by virtue of living in the U.S., critics have said that the mandate is a
19.

49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2010); 40 C.F.R. § 86.000-28 (2011) (setting emissions standards for

automobiles that manufacturers have chosen to meet with catalytic converters).

20.
21.
22.

16 C.F.R. § 1513.3(a) (2011).
24 C.F.R. § 3280.208 (2010).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

23.
Congress could pass other laws to make sure that people actually eat their broccoli.
The
federal government could require hamburgers, hot dogs, French fries and soft drinks to be fortified with
broccoli. Congress could mandate broccoli fortification for Lucky Charmso, Hershey'so Bars and
Twinkieso, just as it now requires vitamin fortification for infant formula. 21 C.F.R. § 107. 100.
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requirement of breathing. 24 My hypothetical-but constitutionally validbroccoli law would be a requirement of eating.
We can generate a mandate to join an exercise club in the same way as
the broccoli mandate. Congress could require that the purchase or homefarming of food be accompanied by the purchase of an exercise club
membership to ensure that people do not become obese from the food they
21
eat.25
My broccoli and exercise club laws are clearly unrealistic. However,
they are no less realistic than the hypothetical statutes of the insurance
mandate critics. The critics posit laws that simply make everyone buy
broccoli or join an exercise club. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine
absurd laws that pass constitutional muster. As Justice Scalia has observed,
the Constitution does not prohibit us "from being assessed a tax of 100% of
our income above the subsistence level, from being forbidden to drive cars,
or from being required to send our children to school for 10 hours a day." 2 6
If the Constitution does not stop the federal government from
imposing laws like a broccoli mandate, what protects us from a Congress
run amok? In general, we must rely on our democratic political process to
protect us from unreasonable statutes. As Chief Justice John Marshall
wrote nearly two hundred years ago, our principal safeguard against overly
burdensome rules is our influence on Congress on Election Day. 27 This
may well have been the lesson of the Republican gains in November 2010.
And of course, Congress never has tried to pass a broccoli or exercise club
mandate.
If it is possible to require desired behavior by regulating economic
activity, why didn't Congress connect the individual mandate to economic
activity? Why didn't Congress impose the individual mandate on people
who purchase medical care? The fact that the health care mandate is not
tied to economic activity simply demonstrates the distinctive nature of
insurance. We cannot let people wait until they need medical care before
they buy health care insurance any more than we can let people wait until
their houses are ablaze before they buy homeowners insurance.
24.
To be sure, the individual mandate does not apply to everyone. Undocumented immigrants,
poor persons and others are exempt from the requirement to carry health care coverage.
25.
Presumably, an exercise club mandate would include exemptions or subsidies for the poormuch like the individual health care mandate.

26.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J.,

concurring).

27.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824).
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In other words, the individual mandate does not suggest a new
willingness by Congress to regulate inactivity. Rather, it reflects a unique
situation that requires the regulation of inactivity. There is no slippery
slope here to be avoided.
Critics of the individual mandate have raised the specter of other
problematic mandates from a federal power to regulate inactivity. The
government might not stop at health-promoting requirements. Judge
Vinson worried that if Congress can require everyone to purchase
insurance for the good of our health care system, then Congress could
require everyone to purchase a domestic automobile for the good of our
economy. 28

This type of hypothetical statute should not cause concern either.
Congress might require everyone to buy an American car, but it is difficult
to see why Congress would do so. Congress could provide ample support
for domestic manufacturers by requiring people to buy from a U.S.
company when they purchase a car-when they are voluntarily engaged in
economic activity. 29
But what if Congress wanted to make everyone buy a domestic car
anyway? It still could do so by regulating economic activity. It could make
ownership of an American car a requirement of purchasing any vehicle,
whether a car, truck, motorcycle, bicycle, skateboard or wheelchair. It
could make ownership of an American car a requirement of buying a ticket
for a plane, train, boat, bus or subway, or of using a taxi or limousine. And
for those people who never use a vehicle of any kind, Congress could make
ownership of an American car a requirement of buying shoes or paying to
have them repaired.
Critics of the individual mandate are correct to argue that the federal
government should not require us to eat our broccoli or exercise daily.
However, they are incorrect to say that the Supreme Court must therefore
strike the health care law down. Permitting Congress to regulate inactivity
will not place us at any greater risk of federal mandates for the purchase of
broccoli, domestic cars or other "virtuous" products.
28.

See Florida v. U.S. Dept. HHS, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla., Jan. 31, 2011). See also Randy

E. Barnett, Commandeering the People. Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 605 (2010).
29.
General Motors needs to sell 2 million vehicles a year to break even, and that number
represents only about one-sixth of total domestic sales. Nick Bunkley, Resurgent G.M. Posts 2010
Profit of $4.7 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, at Bl. While a domestic car mandate would not
violate the Constitution, it might violate international trade agreements.

